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I. Anticipating the Future
A. The population in the border region is
projected to double by the year 2000.
B. What suggestions can we make to improve
the security of water supply and thereby
the investment of users of transboundary
aquifers?
C. How can we assure that each nation will
receive a fair share of transboundary
waters?
C.	 How can we avoid what Professor Clark
calls "education by disaster"?
II. Legal Context
A.	 National Practice
1. Law and institutions for the manage-
ment and equitable distribution of
groundwater have been slow to develop.
2. In particular the law has not under-
stood well the relationships between
groundwater and surface waters.
3. Trends are now changing and more at-
tention is being paid to groundwater
regulation.
a. Change due to growing felt need
to manage and protect groundwater
resources.
4. As populations increase and economic
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development advances, the need to
regulate the use of groundwaters
increases.
5. with new policies affecting ground-
water, there must be established
adequate administrative machinery.
E. The challenge is for lawyers, work-
ing with other disciplines, to fash-
ion legal regimes and management
machinery to prudently manage na-
tional as well as transboundary
groundwater resources.
B.	 International Practice
1. Even less fully developed than na-
tional practice is international
practice concerning aquifers di-
vided by political boundaries.
2. Caponera and Alheritiere conclude,
after surveying international treaty
practice, that references to ground-
water are scant and too limited in
scope to propose them in terms of
customary law.
a. They were unable to find any de-
cisions of international courts
specifically on the question of
groundwater.
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3. Groundwater, like surface water,
knows no political boundaries, and
there are many large aquifers shared
by several countries.
4. There are in fact some interna-
tional treaties which refer speci-
fically to groundwater, for example:
a, Minute 242 under the 1944 treaty
between the United States and
Mexico restricts groundwater
pumping on one segment of the
boundary.
B. 1925 Agreement between Egypt
and Italy on the Ramba Well.
c. 1927 Convention and Protocol be-
tween the USSR and Turkey re-
garding the use of frontier
waters.
d. 1947 treaty of peace between
the Allies and Italy which out-
lines guarantees between Italy
and Yugoslavia concerning springs
in the Commune of Gorizia.
e. 1958 Agreement between Yugoslav-
ia and Bulgaria.
5. However, even in these treaties,
groundwater is usually only a sec-
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ondary issue which is mentioned
almost in passing.
III. The Economic Context 
A. common Law Theory
1. Under the common law theory, each
owner's right to the water itself,
or the right to use the waterS is
insecure because other pumpers may
take possession at any time.
2. The individual surface owner feels
encouraged to exploit the ground-
water as quickly as possible, so it
will not be captured by others.
3. This leads to great insecurity for
all existing users of waters from
an aquifer.
4. The common law rule of absolute
ownership increases tenure insecur-
ity by countenancing the right to
pump all of the water needed, with-
out restraint or liability to other
overlying owners for adverse effects
of pumping.
B.	 Economic Consequences
1. There is an economic incentive for
overinvestment and for depletion,
rather than for conservation.
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2. Both economic waste and resource
waste are likely, due to insecurity
arising from inadequate institu-
tional controls.
3. Increased use by one pumper can
lead to increased marginal costs of
second pumper.
IV. Political Context 
A. Political resistance to closer controls
on groundwater is great even within the
boundaries of one nation, and greater
at the international level.
B. At the international level, one can ex-
pect intense opposition from some af-
fected interest groups.
C. Given the sovereign sensitivities of
nation states, comprehensive interna-
tional management is not likely to be
successful.
D. More modest proposals which intrude on
national sovereignty as little as pos-
sible and retain national supervision
and enforcement as much as possible
have the greatest likelihood of accept-
ance, and even that will not be easy.
V. Goals to be Sought by Transboundary Water 
Institutions 






E. Rational utilization of the resource.
VI. Possible Options 
A.	 Option 1, Do Nothing
1. Continue to follow the English
Common Law doctrine allowing each
country to use and exploit its
groundwater resources without
regard for its neighbor. This
would lead to:
a. neither of the water users hav-
ing security in that resource;
b. uneconomic development by en-
couraging over rapid development;
c. increased marginal cost to all
exploiters of the resource;
d. encouragement of the depletion
of the resource.
B.	 Option 2, International Litigation
1. Better for the two nations to reach
agreement on binational basis ra-
ther than require litigation be-
fore the International Court of
Justice or a tribunal of arbitration.
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2. The courts, too, undoubtedly would
prefer that the parties settle the
matter bewteen themselves rather
than resorting to litigation.
a. The court in Colorado v. Kansas 
(320 U,S. 383 (1943)) elabor-
ated on the point by saying that
"mutual accommodation and agree-
ment should; if possible, be the
medium of settlemt, instead of
the invocation of our adjudica-
tory power." (Id. at 392.)
3. In the event a groundwater question
between Mexico and the United States
were referred to litigation, the
court undoubtedly would conclude
that a nation does not have absolute
territorial sovereignty, that it can-
not act in disregard of its neighbor.
a. In the interstate water litiga-
tion between Wyoming and Colorado,
C25R U.S. 419, 466 (1922): see
Wyoming v. Colorado 286 U.S. 494
(1952)) the United States Supreme
Court reached an analogous con-
clusion.
b. The much quoted International
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Trail Smelter Case (Trail Smel-
ter Arbitral Decision, 35 AM.
J. INTL. L. 684, 714 (1941))
held "no state has the right to
use or permit the use of its
territory in such a manner as
to cause injury by fumes in or
to the territory of another."
4. An international tribunal undoubt-
edly would reject the international
law equivalent of the common law
doctrine, absolute territorial sov-
ereignty.
C.	 Option 3, Alternative Institutional Ap-
proaches
1. Equitable Apportionment Under an
International Commission
a. Responsibility to identify and
declare "designated interna-
tional groundwater areas" having
"reasonably ascertainable bound-
aries;"
b. Authority to apportion the waters
of the aquifer and close the area
to withdrawals, beyond the allow-
able as determined by the physical
criteria of the aquifer.
2. Case-by-Case Apportionment
-8-
a. Individual agreements would be
negotiated for each groundwater
area as problems arose, using
a variety of engineering and
legal measures including the
negotiated apportionment of
the waters of the aquifer.
3. Comprehensive Management by Inter-
national Commission
a. A third variation of the man-
agement option would be to give
the commission the complete
spectrum of administrative
powers from investigation and
planning to rule making and en-
forcement.
b. This, perhaps would be the ideal
approach, but the least likely
to be accepted.
VII. Fguitable Apportionment Under the Auspices 
of an International Institution 
A.	 General Considerations
1. There must be conjunctive manage-
ment of surface and groundwater in
areas where supplies are interre-
lated.
2. Legal rights should take into ac-
count the hydrologic fact that
-9-
water is a fugitive resource,
3. Decisions on spacing of wells and
rate of drawdown need to be car.,
ried out according to a reasoned
development scheme.
4. Controls must be placed on drill,r
ing in areas where present and fu-
ture uses may be endangered.
5, The management effort must include
and be related to all water qual-
ity matters.
F. Underground water resources divided
by international boundaries may be
equitably apportioned and in that
apportioning shared groundwater may
be treated in the same manner as
shared surface water.
7. Allocation of shared groundwater
should not be determined by national
legal regimes acting unilaterally.
8. Groundwater resources hydrologically
not interconnected with surface flows
and not situated physically astride
the boundary should be excluded.
-10-
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
	
FILED
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO	 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
k.11 ;,•	 :	 •	 ,
THE CITY OF EL PASO, by and through
its Public Service Board, RAY PEARSON,
CARLTON C. ROMAN, JR., LOUIE GIALLANZA,
CLINTON E. WOLF, and THOMAS D. WESTFALL,
Plaintiffs,
vs.	 CIV NO. 80-730 HB
S. E. REYNOLDS, individually and as
State Engineer of New Mexico,
JEFF BINGAMAN, individually and as
Attorney General of New Mexico,
LALO GARZA, individually and as
New Mexico District Attorney for
Dona Ana County,
Defendants,
ELEPHANT BUTTE IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
THE CITY OF LAS CRUCES, NEW MEXICO,
and STAHMANN FARMS, INC.,
Defendant-Intervenors.
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
This case raises the question of the constitu-
tionality of New Mexico's prohibition of the out-of-
state export of ground water referred to by the parties
as "the New Mexico ground water embargo." Trial of the
factual issues has been held at which the parties intro-
duced the testimony of witnesses and numerous exhibits.
In addition, a supplementary hearing was held at which
the parties presented evidence in light of the decision
of the Supreme Court in Sporhase v. Nebraska, 	 U.S.
, 102 S.Ct. 3456 (1982).
BACKGROUND 
The Rio Grande River has its source in Colorado,
flows through New Mexico, and forms the international
boundary between Texas and Mexico before discharging
into the Gulf of Mexico. Elephant Butte Reservoir sits
astride the Rio Grande in New Mexico, approximately 100
miles north of the Texas border, and impounds water for
the use of irrigators within the Rio Grande Project
(hereinafter "the Project"), a federal reclamation
project that services approximately 159,000 acres of
land in New Mexico and Texas. Two large aquifers known
as the Hueco and Mesilla Bolsons underlie portions of
southern New Mexico, western Texas and the Republic of
Mexico. The Lower Rio Grande Underground Water Basin
consists of that part of the Mesilla Bolson in New
Mexico declared by the New Mexico State Engineer,
1
thereby giving him regulatory jurisdiction over the
acquisition of waters within the basin. The Hueco
Underground Water Basin comprises that part of the Hueco
Bolson in New Mexico similarly declared by the New
Mexico State Engineer.
1The State Engineer can declare underground
waters to be public waters,thereby bringing them under
his control and supervision, if he finds that they have
reasonably ascertainable boundaries. S 72-12-1 N.M.Stat.Ann.
(1978).
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Plaintiff City of El Paso, with a population
of approximately 450,000, is located on the Rio Grande
in western Texas bordering the State of New Mexico. The
individually named plaintiffs are residents of El Paso.
The New Mexico State Engineer, the New Mexico Attorney
General and the, District Attorney for Dona Ana County,
New Mexico, are the state officials responsible for
enforcing New Mexico laws regulating surface and ground
waters. N.M. Stat. Ann. S 72-12-21 (1978).
Three parties have been granted leave to
intervene as defendants. Defendant-Intervenor Elephant
Butte Irrigation District (EBID) is an irrigation district
incorporated and organized under New Mexico law to
cooperate with the United States in the administration
and distribution of irrigation water to member users
within its boundaries pursuant to federal reclamation
law. Specifically, the EBID has the responsibility of
delivering water from the Rio Grande Project to the New
Mexico recipients of the Project water. Defendant-
Intervenor City of Las Cruces, New Mexico, is located on
the Rio Grande River in southern New Mexico and is the
second largest water user of the Lower Rio Grande
Basin. Defendant-Intervenor Stahmann Farms, Inc., is a
New Mexico corporation conducting farming operations
within the EBID. It utilizes surface water from the Rio
Grande Project and ground water from the Lower Rio Grande
Basin for its crop production.
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Water in the Southwest is a scarce natural resource.
The availability of water, therefore, is critical to the
economic development of both the municipal and agricultural
communities in southern New Mexico and El Paso. El Paso
now obtains its water supply from the surface waters of
the Rio Grande and wells in the . Hueco and Mesilla Bolsons
in Texas. These sources of supply will be insufficient
to meet the city's future needs, and it must arrange
alternative water supplies to support its growing population
and stimulate economic growth. The city has concluded
that the most appropriate water sources are the Hueco
and Mesilla Bolsons in New Mexico just across the state
line. Accordingly, El Paso filed with the New Mexico
State Engineer, pursuant to 572-12-3 N.M.Stat.Ann.
(1978), 326 applications for permits to appropriate up
to 296,000 acre-feet of water annually from the Lower
Rio Grande and Hueco Basins. The State Engineer
denied all 326 applications on the ground that Article
XVI, 55 2 and 3 of the New Mexico Constitution precludes
utilization of New Mexico ground water outside the
borders of the state.
El Paso also owns a tract of land which straddles
the New Mexico-Texas border and, as a New Mexico landowner,
it can obtain a permit to appropriate ground water from
its New Mexico land for domestic use pursuant to 5 72-12-1
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N.M.Stat. Ann. (1978). The city is prepared to use this
water on its adjoining land in Texas. In addition,
plaintiff Wolf has contracted to purchase New Mexico
ground water for use on neighboring land he owns in
Texas. Finally, plaintiffs contracted to purchase two
thousand gallons of water from a New Mexico company that
produces water from the Lea County Underground Basin in
eastern New Mexico. Unlike the other sources from which
plaintiffs propose to export water to El Paso, the Lea
County Basin is not hydrologically connected to the Rio
Grande. (The parties dispute whether this contract was
revoked, but in view of the court's disposition of the
merits it is irrelevant.)
A New Mexico statute which, with minor exceptions,
expressly prohibits the transport of ground water from
New Mexico for use in another state 2 is an absolute
2In pertinent part the statute reads:
No person shall withdraw water from any underground
source in New Mexico for use in any other state by
drilling a well in New Mexico and transporting the water
outside the state or by drilling a well outside the
boundaries of New Mexico and pumping water from under
lands lying within the boundaries of New Mexico; provided
that nothing in this act prohibits the transportation of
water by tank truck from an underground source in New
Mexico to any other state where the water is used for
exploration and drilling for oil or gas . . . . The
amount of water withdrawn from any one well for such
exportation shall never exceed three acre-feet.
S 72-12-19 N.M.Stat.Ann. (1978).
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barrier to plaintiffs' use of ground water drawn from
wells in New Mexico. Plaintiffs here seek both a declaration
that New Mexico's ground water embargo is unconstitutional,
whether it derives from the state constitution or N.M.Stat.Ann.
S 72-12-19 (1978), and an injunction against its enforcement.
As grounds therefor plaintiffs contend that the embargo
violates the Commerce Clause of Article I of the United
States Constitution.
JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES 
Before addressing the merits it is necessary
to dispose of several jurisdictional arguments raised by
the defendants and intervenors. Defendants maintain
that the court cannot rule on the constitutionality of
the embargo because of a jurisdictional flaw. At different
stages in these proceedings they have articulated their
argument in terms of standing, justiciable controversy,
the Eleventh Amendment and indispensable parties.
As a foundation for the argument, defendants
claim that it is the Rio Grande Compact, not S 72-12-19,
which is the true obstacle to El Paso's export of New
Mexico's ground water. Thus, a decision on the constitutionality
of the statute without adjudication of the Compact issue
would be advisory only and would not settle the controversy.
By defendants' concession, the argument depends on the
validity of three factual assertions: (1) all of the
waters in which El Paso has asserted an interest are Rio
Grande waters; (2) the Rio Grande Compact apportions the
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surface waters of the Rio Grande between the states of
New Mexico and Texas and controls the use of hydrologically
related ground water; and (3) any taking of ground water
is ultimately fully reflected in the flow of the river.
From this defendants then conclude that any
withdrawal of ground water hydrologically connected with
the Rio Grande will effect a reapportionment of the
river between Texas and New Mexico, while the Compact
can be amended properly only by agreement of the parties
thereto or in an original action in the Supreme Court.
The Compact, thus, would bar plaintiffs' asserted interests
in the ground water in the Lower Rio Grande and Hueco
Basins, forever preventing those interests from materializ-
ing and depriving plaintiffs of standing to challenge
the constitutionality of the embargo statute. As a
corollary, because the State Engineer could not recognize
a water right that would undermine the Compact appropriation,
he would not have occasion to enforce S 72-12-19, and
the Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), exception to the
Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable.
Having advanced the proposition that the court
must address the Rio Grande Compact, defendants then
point out that the parties to the Compact -- the United
States and the states of Colorado, New Mexico and Texas --
are indispensable to its construction. Of course, the United
States cannot be joined without its consent, and the Eleventh
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Amendment bars joinder of the states. If the court
declines to construe the Compact in the absence of the
signatories, defendants insist that the entire action
must be dismissed because, coming full circle, it is
really the Compact that bars the export of the water El
Paso seeks. Therefore, a decision on the constitutionality
of the statute would be academic.
Defendants' jurisdictional argument suffers
from many defects aside from its sheer complexity.
First, as discussed below, the Rio Grande Compact does
not apportion the surface waters of the Rio Grande below
Elephant Butte between New Mexico and Texas. Second,
even assuming the Compact protects surface water rights
within the Rio Grande Project from impairment through
pumping of hydrologically connected ground water, pumping
can still be permitted. The State Engineer need only
condition ground water permits to require offsets of the
effects on the river through return flows or retirement
of prior surface and/or ground water rights. Over
10,000 acres of land outside the Project are currently
irrigated with Mesilla Bolson ground water; the retirement
of these water rights would not alter the distribution
of the water within the Project. The State Engineer can
deal with these issues of impairment of Project rights
and any required offsets in the state administrative
well permit proceedings. 5 72-12-3 N.M. Stat. Ann.
(1978).
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Finally, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
19 the Compact signatories are not indispensable parties.
Not being parties to this action, they are not bound by
the judgment herein. Although both defendants and
intervenors urge dismissal under Rule 19, neither have
demonstrated that plaintiffs have an adequate alternative
remedy. In fact, if this action is dismissed for lack
of indispensable parties, plaintiffs will be unable to
challenge the constitutionality of New Mexico's ground
water embargo by any other proceeding.
Intervenors make two additional jurisdictional
arguments. They first assert that El Paso's attempt to
appropriate the public waters of New Mexico is an action
against the state itself which is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. The Supreme Court, in Sporbase v. Nebraska,
expressly held that a state's espoused ownership of
water is a legal fiction. 102 S.Ct. at 3462. Furthermore,
plaintiffs seek only prospective relief as permitted
under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) and Quern v. 
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
Intervenors once again raise the argument that
the United States, Texas and New Mexico are indispensable
parties, since any ground water El Paso takes from the
Lower Rio Grande or Hueco Basins will affect surface
flows apportioned among Texas, New Mexico and Mexico.
The court has ruled on this argument before. Memorandum
Opinion at 2 (July 8, 1981). Plaintiffs do not here ask
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for water or water rights; the decision in this case
will not result in an appropriation of New Mexico ground
water by El Paso. The sole issue in this suit is the
validity of New Mexico's ban on the export of ground
water.
THE RIO GRANDE COMPACT 
As discussed above, defendants have consistently
maintained that the paramount obstacle to El Paso's
export of New Mexico ground water is the Rio Grande
Compact of 1938, 53 Stat. 785 (1939), because any
ground water pumping by El Paso would take surface water
apportioned to New Mexico under the Compact. Intervenors
contend that the embargo statute merely implements the
apportionment incorporated in the Compact and therefore
cannot be deemed in contravention of the Commerce
Clause.
Both facets of the Compact defense hinge
entirely on the validity of two factual contentions:
that the Compact (1) apportions the surface waters of
the Rio Grande between New Mexico and Texas below Elephant
Butte and (2) controls the use of hydrologically related
ground water. In regard to the first contention,
defendants argue that the words of the Compact as well
as its history dictate the conclusion that the Compact
effects an apportionment between New Mexico and Texas.
The words on which defendants rely are contained in the
preamble and Article XI; 3 the history follows.
In 1905 Congress authorized the construction
of a dam on the Rio Grande to provide for the irrigation
of lands in New Mexico and Texas as well as to enable
the nation to meet forthcoming treaty obligations to
Mexico. 4 Act of Feb. 25, 1905, 33 Stat. 814. On recom-
mendation of the Reclamation Service the dam was con-
structed at Elephant Butte, 100 miles north of the New
Mexico-Texas border, and the Rio Grande Project was
born. Irrigation districts were formed to operate and
maintain the irrigation works in the two states: the
Elephant Butte Irrigation District in New Mexico and the
3Preamble: "The state of Colorado, the state
of New Mexico and the state of Texas, desiring to remove
all causes of present and future controversy among these
states and between citizens of one of these states and
citizens of another state with respect to the use of the
waters of the Rio Grande above Fort Quitman, Texas, and
being moved by considerations of interstate comity, and
for the purpose of effecting an equitable apportionment
of such waters, have resolved to conclude a compact for
the attainment of these purposes, . . . ."
Article XI: "New Mexico and Texas agree that
upon the effective date of this compact [this section]
all controversies between said states relative to the
quantity or quality of the water of the Rio Grande are
composed and settled; 	
S 72-15-23 N.M.Stat.Ann. (1978).
4Pursuant to its convention with Mexico concluded
May 21, 1906 (34 Stat. 2953), the United States is
obligated to deliver to Mexico 60,000 acre feet of water
annually, in the bed of the Rio Grande above the city of
Juarez, Mexico.
El Paso County Water Improvement District No. 1 in
Texas. The two irrigation districts and the Reclamation
Service entered into water contracts for the irrigation
of approximately 66,650 acres of land in Texas and
88,350 acres in New Mexico. This ratio of irrigated
lands--57% in New Mexico and 43% in Texas--has remained
constant.
Increasing diversions of the Rio Grande in
Colorado decreased the flow of the river above Elephant
Butte in the 1920's, resulting in the appointment of a
commission comprised of representatives from Colorado,
New Mexico, Texas and the United States to apportion
the waters of the river. The Rio Grande Compact of
1929, 46 Stat. 767 (1930), was the first product of this
commission. An interim measure, it maintained the
status quo on the river pending the negotiation of an
ultimate compact and directed the state and federal
commissioners to conclude an apportionment of the Rio
Grande on the basis of the uses then existing in each
state.
In 1938 the commission proceeded to apportion
the waters of the river on the basis of detailed hydrologic
information derived from extensive investigations of the
river flow and use of the water which had been made by
the Water Resources Committee. Under the resulting Rio
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Grande Compact of 1938, Colorado is obligated to make
its delivery of water at the Colorado-New Mexico state
line. Article III. In contrast, New Mexico is obligated
to make delivery not at the New Mexico-Texas state line
but "into Elephant Butte Reservoir.° 5 Article IV. The
Commission calculated that compliance by Colorado and
New Mexico with the delivery schedules set forth in
Articles III and IV would permit an average normal
release from Elephant Butte Reservoir of 790,000 acre-
feet per year, an amount sufficient to irrigate the
Project lands in New Mexico and Texas and to honor the
United States' obligation to Mexico.
On the basis of these undisputed historical
facts defendants argue that the Rio Grande Compact of
1938 apportioned the waters of the Edo Grande between
New Mexico and Texas below Elephant Butte. The signi-
ficance of this argument becomes apparent only in light
of the second contention defendants advance, which is that
the Compact controls the use of ground water hydrologically
connected to the apportioned surface water.
5New Mexico's delivery obligation into Elephant
Butte Reservoir is set forth in a complex schedule of
deliveries that is based on the relationship between the
amount of water in the Rio Grande above the principal
agricultural areas in New Mexico and the inflow to
Elephant Butte.
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With the exception of the tankful of water
plaintiffs contracted to purchase from Lea County, all
the water which plaintiffs are prepared to export is
hydrologically connected to the Rio Grande. Because the
Rio Grande is a "losing stream" which feeds into the
underlying, connected ground water, any withdrawal of
ground water will eventually be reflected in depletion
of the surface flow of the river.
The New Mexico State Engineer administers
interrelated surface and ground waters as an integral
unit. It is defendants' contention that to authorize
any withdrawal of ground water connected to the Rio
Grande without impairing prior vested surface water
rights, particularly those of the irrigators in the
EBID, the State Engineer would have to require the
retirement of a comparable amount of existing surface
use. Defendants predict that approval of all plaintiffs'
applications would result in the complete demise of
surface irrigation in the Rio Grande Project, both in
New Mexico and Texas. Their particular objection,
however, is to the retirement of any water rights within
the EBID on the ground that this would be tantamount to
a reapportionment of the Rio Grande in contravention of
the Compact.
As stated at the outset, the success of defendants'
Rio Grande Compact defense depends on the validity of
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two factual assertions: that the Compact (1) apportions the
surface water of the Rio Grande between New Mexico and
Texas and; (2) controls the use of ground water hydrologically
connected to the River. This court is unable to accept
either. Neither the history of the Compact negotiations,
the ultimate terms of the Compact,nor the defendants'
subsequent interpretation and actions support the conclusion
that the parties to the agreement intended it to apportion
either the surface water of the river or the related
ground water below Elephant Butte between New Mexico and
Texas.
Defendants argue that it was impracticable to
require delivery of Texas' equitable share of the water
at the New Mexico-Texas state line because of the existence
of Elephant Butte Reservoir 100 miles north of that
line, which provided water for the entire Rio Grande
Project spanning both states. They assert that the
Compact negotiators availed themselves of the facilities
at hand -- the existing works of the Project -- and
relied on the United States Bureau of Reclamation as
administrator of the Project to effectuate the apportionment
between the states which is implicit in the Compact.
Because the Compact itself nowhere enumerates the amount
of Texas' equitable apportionment, defendants in turn
rely on the initial contracts between the Reclamation
/1"
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Service and the irrigation districts to define the
amounts of water allegedly apportioned to each state.
Defendants conclude that the division by the Project
Administrator of the water stored in Elephant Butte
Reservoir between the 88,650 irrigated acres in New
Mexico and 66,350 acres in Texas, or 57% to New Mexico
and 43% to Texas, defines the states' respective entitlements.
It is unnecessary to accept defendants' labyrinthian
argument for full meaning to be given to the words and
history of the Compact. The preamble states that the
purpose of the Compact is to effect an equitable apportion-
ment of the waters of the Rio Grande; that it did.
Article XI states that the Compact composed and settled
all controversies between New Mexico and Texas relative
to the quality and quantity of the water of the Rio Grande;
this it also did. However, it did not apportion any
specified amount of water to Texas below Elephant
Butte.
Defendants concede that the Compact does not
literally apportion the Rio Grande between New Mexico
and Texas and that no language in the Compact expressly
assigns any amount of water to the state of Texas.
Indeed, on its face the Compact simply apportions the
water of the river first between Colorado and the downstream
states; it then apportions the remaining water between
the New Mexican appropriators above Elephant Butte and
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the New Mexican, Texan and Mexican appropriators below
Elephant Butte. while Colorado is required to make a
scheduled delivery of water annually at the Colorado-New
Mexico state line, New Mexico is not required to deliver
anything at the New Mexico-Texas state line. New Mexico's
only delivery obligation is set forth in Article IV of
the Compact, which designates Elephant Butte Reservoir as
the point of delivery.
The history of the Compact indicates that the
real bargaining positions were taken by Colorado, the
Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District water users
represented by New Mexico 
6
and the Rio Grande Project
water users represented by Texas. Jenkins, Myra Ellen,
The Rio Grande Compact of 1938 (to be published, 1982),
pp. 51-6. Texas found itself in the position of protecting
water rights of all the lands in the Project and, consequently,
the users in the New Mexico section of the Project
supported Texas' stance rather than New Mexico's. Id.,
p. 52. See also Hill, R., Development of the Rio Grande 
Compact of 1938, p. 17-18.
6The Middle Rio Grande Valley of New Mexico is
the 160 mile stretch of the river between Cochiti Dam
and Elephant Butte Reservoir. Water appropriators in
this section of the river are organized into the Middle
Rio Grande Conservancy District, a corporation and
political subdivision of the state of New Mexico.
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This alignment is also reflected in the statements
of the views of the states of New Mexico and Texas
delivered by their respective commissioners at the
September 28, 1937 meeting of the Compact Commission.
Mr. McClure, the New Mexico Commissioner, presented the
New Mexico position:
New Mexico is willing to negotiate with Colorado
and Texas for a permanent compact to equitably
distribute the waters of the Rio Grande among
the states on the basis of the following
minimum requirements for the State of New
Mexico:
Second: New Mexico is willing to negotiate
with the State of Texas as to the right to
the use of water claimed by citizens of Texas
under the Elephant Butte Project on the basis
of fixing a definite amount of water to which
said project is entitled. Provided, however,
that upon the completion of the All-American
Diversion Dam and canal, Mexico shall be
limited strictly to treaty provision of 60,000
acre-feet per annum for use in the
Republic of Mexico.
Mr. Clayton presented the Texas position:
Although the State of Texas feels that it
should share in the benefits from new works
for the augmentation of the water supply of
the Rio Grande, it will not insist thereon,
provided that the States of Colorado and New
Mexico will release and deliver at San Marcial
a supply of water sufficient to assure the
release annually from Elephant Butte Reservoir
of 800,000 acre-feet of the same average
quality as during the past ten years, or the
equivalent of this quantity if the quality of
the supply is altered by any developments
upstream.
Proceedings of the Meeting of the Rio Grande Compact
Commission, p. 12-13 (Sept. 28, 1937).
Prior to the filing of this lawsuit the State
Engineer publicly enunciated the position he now repudiates.
In 1956 he delivered a paper at the New Mexico College
of Agricultural & Mechanical Arts wherein he stated,
"The compact does not, in fact, apportion the waters
between New Mexico and Texas, but rather between the
water users in New Mexico above Elephant Butte on one
hand and the water users in Texas and New Mexico below
Elephant Butte on the other hand." The State Engineer
never contradicted this statement until defendants began
formulating their defense to El Paso's complaint in the
case at bar.
The state of New Mexico also took the position
that the Compact does not apportion the Rio Grande
between New Mexico and Texas in a motion and brief
submitted to the United States Supreme Court in Texas v. 
New Mexico, Original No. 9. In a Motion for Return to
Rule the state of New Mexico made the categorical statement:
"The Rio Grande Compact makes no apportionment of the
use of such waters between the States of Texas and New
Mexico." Motion for Return to Rule at 5. New Mexico
told the Supreme Court that,
In view of the fact that there are in New
Mexico over 85 4000 acres of land below
Elephant Butte which are watered from the Rio
Grande, it cannot be said that the obligation
imposed on New Mexico to make certain scheduled
deliveries at San Marcial, 165 miles north of
the New Mexico-Texas state line, is an appor-
tionment of the waters of the Rio Grande
between the states of Texas and New Mexico.
Brief in support of Return to Rule at 8.
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Other statements of the same import are scattered thrcughout
the Brief in Support of the Return to Rule.
Defendants claim that the Supreme Court rejected
New Mexico's position in the Motion for Return to Rule
and on two other occasions. Texas v. New Mexico, 343
U.S. 932 (1952); Texas v. New Mexico, 308 U.S. 510
(1939); Texas v. New Mexico, 352 U.S. 991 (1957). None
of these rulings contain or constitute a decision as to
the proper interpretation of the Rio Grande Compact.
The Compact apportions the river by requiring
New Mexico to make deliveries at Elephant Butte according
to a quantified in-flow, out-flow schedule. This is the
apportionment sought by New Mexico and Texas in the
Compact negotiations. This is the apportionment that
defines the respective rights of the two states and
that Texas has a right to enforce. Texas v. New Mexico,
343 U.S. 932 (1952). Contrary to defendants' contention,
a decision that the Compact does not apportion the river
below Elephant Butte does not mean that New Mexico,
having made its delivery, could undermine it by pumping
down the surface flow of the river below the point of
delivery. This opinion does not address that issue at
all.
Defendant-Intervenors take a slightly different
tack. Bowing to the plain meaning of the Compact, they
concede that it does not apportion the waters of the
river below Elephant Butte. Like the defendants, however,
-20-
intervenors also rely on the Project's division of the
waters released from Elephant Butte to effect an appor-
tionment not effected by the Compact. They contend that
Texas is entitled only to that amount of water which is
allocated to Texas lands by the Project Administrator.
Acceptance of intervenors' argument would
require the further acceptance of a corollary not expressly
enunciated by them, i.e., that the contracts between the
Bureau of Reclamation and the farmers in the two irrigation
districts effected an equitable apportionment of the
waters of the river below Elephant Butte which is binding
on the states of Texas and New Mexico. Although Congress
can authorize the Secretary of the Interior to allocate
interstate waters among states via contracts for water
stored in federal reservoirs, the circumstances which
led the Supreme Court to conclude that Congress had done
just that in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963)
were vastly different from those at hand.
The court in Arizona v. California relied on
the legislative history of the Boulder Canyon Project
Act which clearly indicated that Congress intended the
Secretary to allocate the waters of the Colorado River
among the states of Arizona, California and Nevada
through his contracts with water users in those states.
373 . U.S. at 580. Congress not only enumerated the
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amounts of the respective allocations to each state, it
set standards for, and placed significant limitations
on, the Secretary's power to distribute the waters. 373
u.S. at 584. The Court also found that the provisions
of the Act provided the machinery by which the Secretary
could accomplish the apportionment it had so plainly
authorized. 373 U.S. at 579.
With the Boulder Canyon Project Act, Congress
thus authorized the Secretary to effect an apportionment
through contracts for reclamation water. The Secretary
then proceeded to allocate the water in accordance with
his congressional authorization. Intervenors do not
argue that Congress intended, in the Act of 1905 authorizing
the Rio Grande Project, to force an allocation of the
Rio Grande upon Texas and New Mexico as a consequence of
the Secretary's contracts with the farmers in the
Project. There is, in fact, nothing in that act even
remotely analogous to the provisions of the Boulder
Canyon Project Act which led the Supreme Court to find
congressional authorization of the Secretary's apportionment.
There is simply no basis for the argument that the
Secretary's contracts with the Project water users
effected an equitable apportionment binding on Texas and
New Mexico.
Were the court to find that the Rio Grande
Compact apportions the river below Elephant Butte, the
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Compact defense still would fail if that apportionment
did not control the use of hydrologically connected
ground water. There is a hydrological connection
between the surface flow of the Rio Grande and the
ground water in the Hueco and Mesilla Bolsons. But the
Compact makes no mention of ground water. The United
States Bureau of Reclamation, manager of the Rio Grande
Project, has never counted ground water used by irrigators
within the EBID as part of the Project's water supply.
Even more telling is the fact that, prior to
the filing of this suit, defendants never took the
position that the Compact apportioned hydrologically
connected ground water. The State Engineer did not even
declare the Lower Rio Grande and Hueco Underground
Basins until after El Paso filed its complaint. Prior
to that time, there was no conjunctive management of the
ground water in these basins and the surface water of
the Rio Grande. Between the signing of the Compact in
1938 and the filing of this suit, thousands of wells
were drilled into the Mesilla Bolson and up to 185,000
acre-feet of water per year were withdrawn, including
the entire water supply for the City of Las Cruces. Yet
no one ever claimed before now that these wells violated
the Compact.
This is not to say that the State Engineer
cannot or should not conjunctively manage the surface
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and ground water in the Lower Rio Grande system. If he
does, however, he must apply it evenhandedly to both New
Mexico and out-of-state appropriators.
If defendants' interpretation of the Compact
were correct, interstate export of Hueco and Lower Rio
Grande Underground Basin water could still be permitted
without effecting a reapportionment-if pumping could be
offset without retiring EBID surface water rights. The
success of defendants' Compact defense finally rests on
their assertion that El Paso's proposed pumping can
only be offset by requiring the retirement of Rio Grande
Project surface water rights in New Mexico, which would
alter the 57%-43% distribution of Project water between
New Mexico and Texas. In addition to the possibility of
retiring the ground water rights appurtenant to the
10,000 acres of non-Project lands in New Mexico mentioned
earlier in this opinion, El Paso has suggested a number
of alternative offsetting measures. Defendants have not
shown that El Paso can offset the effects of its pumping
only by retiring surface water rights of EBID irrigators.
Issues of impairment of prior water rights -- surface or
ground, within the Project or without -- and measures
for offsetting impairments should be addressed in administrative
hearings on plaintiffs' permit applications, not by an
absolute embargo on the interstate export of ground
water.
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THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
At the January,1982,trial of this case defen-
dants and intervenors contended that the Commerce Clause
did not render the embargo unconstitutional for three
reasons: Cl) water was not an article of commerce and,
therefore, commerce clause analysis was inapplicable;
(2) Congress had authorized the western states to
impose otherwise impermissible burdens on commerce in
ground water; and (3) New Mexico's exercise of plenary
authority over its internal waters was a traditional
governmental function beyond the reach of the Commerce
Clause.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Sporhase 
v. Nebraska has settled these issues. The Court ruled
that water is an article of commerce and that Congress'
long-standing deference to state water law did not
demonstrate an intent to permit discrimination against
interstate commerce in ground water. Nor are federal
constitutional constraints suspended merely because a
state claims public ownership of internal ground waters.
Although such a claim "may support a limited preference
for its own citizens in the utilization of the resource,"
102 S.Ct. at 3464, a state's asserted ownership of
public waters within the state is only a legal fiction.
102 S.Ct. at 3462.
The Court's disposition of these aspects of
defendants' Commerce Clause defense does not settle the
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constitutionality of the New Mexico water embargo. The
Court in Sporhase recognized that, in the absence of
federal regulation, the states are not precluded from
regulating either their water resources or interstate
commerce in water. The validity of state statutes
affecting interstate commerce in water is determined by
applying the standard set out in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970):
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are
only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. [Citation omitted.) If a legitimate
local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the
burden that will be tolerated will of course
depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted
as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities.
New Mexico's embargo bars the export of ground
water absolutely; it is an explicit barrier to interstate
commerce. Facially discriminatory, it is subject to the
strictest scrutiny. Defendants must demonstrate that
the embargo serves a legitimate local purpose, that it
is narrowly tailored to that purpose and that there are
no adequate non-disctiminatory alternatives. Hughes v. Oklahoma,
441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979). The purpose defendants
advance for New Mexico's overall system of ground water
regulation is to conserve and preserve the state's
internal water supply. They point to the state's
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longstanding water management laws, institutions, policies
and public expenditures as evidence that the purpose is
genuine.
Water has always been a highly valued resource
in New Mexico because of the state's aridity. Consequently,
the use of water in New Mexico has long been subject to
strict regulation and control under a comprehensive
system of water rights laws and institutions. Chapter
72, N.M.Stat.Ann. (1978). In fact, New Mexico was a
pioneer in ground water management. The state's declared
ground waters are public waters, S 72-12-1 N.M.Stat.Ann.
(1978), subject to appropriation for beneficial use,
ra-	 S 72-12-2 N.M.Stat.Ann. (1978). The State Engineer has
the responsibility for measuring, appropriating and
distributing the public waters of the state. S 72-2-1,
N.M.Stat.Ann. (1978). In a declared underground basin,
would-be appropriators must apply to the State Engineer
for a permit. He may grant the permit only if he finds
that there are unappropriated waters available and that
existing water rights would be unimpaired. S 72-12-3
N.M.Stat.Ann. (1978). The State Engineer monitors
withdrawals from non-rechargeable aquifers to ensure
that they have a reasonable life. Mathers v. Texaco, Inc.,
77 N.M. 239, 421 P.2d 771 (1966).
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Taken as a whole, New Mexico's scheme of water
regulation demonstrates a genuine effort to promote
optimum utilization of its diminishing water resources.
This effort "is unquestionably legitimate and highly
important." 102 S.Ct. at 3463. While it may justify
limited, non-discriminatory burdens on interstate
commerce, it cannot support a total ban on interstate
transportation of ground water.
In Sporhase the Supreme Court recognized the
long-standing Commerce Clause distinction "between
economic protectionism, on the one hand, and health and
safety regulation, on the other." 102 S.Ct. at 3464.
This distinction gives a state the power "to shelter its
people from menances to their health or safety" but not
"to retard, burden or constrict the flow of ... commerce
for their economic advantage ...." H.P. Hood v. DuMond,
336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949). Thus, the Supreme Court held
that a state may discriminate in favor of its citizens
only to the extent that water is essential to human
survival. Outside of fulfilling human survival needs,
water is an economic resource. For purposes of constitutional
analysis under the Commerce Clause, it is to be treated
the same as other natural resources.
Constitutional restrictions on the ability of
the states to burden the flow of interstate commerce in
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natural resources lie at the heart of our national
solidarity and prosperity. It was the anarchy and
commercial warfare between the states which emerged
after the Revolutionary War that led to the Constitutional
Convention. Having experienced the rivalries and dis-
ruptions caused by economic barriers and retaliations,
the necessity for centralized regulation of commerce among
the states was obvious to the Founders. H. P. Hood v. 
DuMond, 336 U.S. at 533-534. The fifty states cannot
operate as separate economic units. Our material success
depends on the vigilant maintenance of the principle
that our economic unit is the entire nation.
Defendants and intervenors do not maintain
that the embargo's purpose is to promote the health and
safety of New Mexico's citizens. They do not maintain
that the state is now experiencing a shortage of water
for health and safety needs or will do so in the near
future. The estimated state-wide demand for water for
public health and safety purposes by the year 2020 is only
220,000 acre-feet per year,while New Mexico's ultimate
renewable supply is estimated to be 2.2 million acre-feet
per year.
The State Engineer testified that the purpose
of the embargo is "to make maximum beneficial use of
water in New Mexico." Defendants believe this is a
legitimate objective because the state's water supply is
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insufficient to meet all projected requirements. Specifi-
cally, they predict that by or before the year 2020
there will be a state-wide consumptive use shortage of
at least 626,000 acre-feet per year.
This predicted shortage is based on what
defendants define as reasonable "public welfare" needs,
including water requirements for municipalities, industry,
irrigated agriculture, energy production, fish and
wildlife, and recreation. Aside from the amount necessary
for public health and safety, these are requirements for
water related to economic activities. In essence,
defendants recognize no limits on the future uses for
which New Mexico should be able to preserve ground
water. However, to extend the state's power to discriminate
to all potential uses of water would remove ground water
from Commerce Clause constraints. The policy of maximizing
all "public welfare" uses of water in New Mexico, and
the furthering of that policy by prohibiting interstate
commerce in ground water, is tantamount to economic
protectionism.
This is not, as defendants and intervenors
claim, a double standard which restricts New Mexico to a
water supply only sufficient to fulfill its human survival
needs while allowing El Paso to blossom in unrestrained
economic prosperity. It is simply the necessary application
of the fundamental principle that our Constitution "was
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framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several
states must sink or swim together, and that in the long
run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division."
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
Nor does it mean that New Mexico cannot undertake
reasonable water planning. The state can and should
carry on its policy of furthering the maximum beneficial
use of the water supply. The absence of an embargo
statute will not create havoc in New Mexico's system of
ground water regulation. It will not result in unrestricted
out-of-state use or uncontrolled transfers of water.
Interstate usage of water can be restricted and controlled
to the same extent as intrastate usage. El Paso has
stated repeatedly that, if the State Engineer approves
its well permit applications, it will abide by all
provisions of New Mexico water law.
Defendants insist that New Mexico's water laws
have no extraterritorial effect, and, therefore, the
State Engineer cannot control El Paso's use of exported
water. In Sporhase the Court held that a state could
impose the same withdrawal and use restrictions on out-
of-state users as it does on its own citizens. 102 S.Ct.
at 3465. Under S 72-12-1 N.M. Stat. Ann. (1978) the
State Engineer can condition any permit granted to El
Paso to require that the City cooperate with New Mexico
officials for the purpose of ensuring that all exported
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water is put to beneficial use. City of Roswell v. Berry,
80 N.M. 110, 112 (1969). The State Engineer's ability
to enforce New Mexico's water regulations lies in his
power to suspend or revoke El Paso's permits to withdraw
ground water. S 72-12-14 N.M. Stat. Ann. (1978). If
the city does not comply with either the conditions of
its permits or New Mexico's water laws, the State Engineer
can terminate El Paso's pumping.
Defendants also raise the specter of the
wholesale "drying up" of southern New Mexico if El Paso
is permitted to export the water it seeks. New Mexico,
however, already contemplates that its irrigated agriculture
will gradually be cannabalized as market forces transfer
water to municipal and industrial use. Thus defendants'
only objection is to the retirement of agricultural
water uses to accommodate non-New Mexican municipal and
industrial uses. Under the Commerce Clause, New Mexico
cannot practice such discrimination.
If the embargo's purpose were to conserve and
preserve the water supply for the health of New Mexico's
citizens and not the health of its economy, it still
would be unconstitutional because it is not narrowly
tailored to achieve that purpose. As stated before,
there is no present or imminent shortage of water in New
Mexico for health and safety needs. In fact, the State
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Engineer testified that New Mexico is far from the time
when water will be a limiting factor on the state's
growth.
Assuming that such shortages were foreseeable
and that New Mexico could constitutionally preserve its
water to meet future shortages, the embargo is not a
means to that end. The embargo only prevents the transfer
of ground water out of the state; it places no restrictions
on in-state use. Under New Mexico's ground water laws
the State Engineer cannot deny an application for a
ground water right if there is unappropriated water
available and other rights will be unimpaired. S 72-12-3
N.M. Stat. Ann. (1978). The state's policy of "maximum
beneficial use" envisions putting as much water to
beneficial use as soon as possible. If New Mexico ever
is faced with a shortage of water for health and safety
purposes, the state's current water code, including the
embargo, will not ensure that there is an adequate
supply in reserve to meet the need.
In Sporhase the Supreme Court found Nebraska's
reciprocity provision was not narrowly tailored to the
conservation/preservation rationale because it prevented
export when water was locally abundant and its most
beneficial use was in another state. The Court suggested
that an arid state could possibly overcome this defect
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if it suffers a water shortage as a whole and "the
intrastate transfer of water from areas of abundance to
areas of shortage is feasible regardless of distance."
102 S.Ct. at 3465.
Although the estimates vary widely, there is
no question that the Hueco and Mesilla Bolsons contain
millions of acre-feet of water, which far exceed local
needs. At the present time the most economically productive
use of this excess water is across the New Mexico-Texas
state line. Municipal and industrial water uses are
more economically productive than other uses. For
example, they will support seventy times as many people
as water applied to irrigated agriculture. El Paso is
the economic hub of an interstate region which includes
southern New Mexico; it is the major trade center and
contains the area's principal employers. If El Paso
were in New Mexico defendants probably would agree with
plaintiffs that the most beneficial and economically
productive use of the Hueco and Mesilla Bolson ground
water is in El Paso for the simple reason that what is
good for El Paso is good for the entire region, including
southern New Mexico.
Defendants have attempted to show that this
locally abundant ground water could be transported to
other areas of New Mexico that are experiencing water
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shortages. They point to examples of water transportation
projects that now exist or are being planned. But none
of these projects involve plans for the intrastate
transfer of Hueco and Mesilla Bolson ground water. The
state has not made any plans for the intrastate transportation
of this water. Prior to this suit defendants assumed
that this water would be used locally, and that still
appears to be the prevailing belief.
Aside from the fact that there are no plans
for intrastate transportation of Hueco and Mesilla
Bolson ground water at the present, defendants have
failed to show that such transportation is "feasible
regardless of distance." 102 S.Ct. at 3465. The feasi-
ility envisioned by the Supreme Court must include
economic considerations because, from a purely engineering
standpoint, it is now possible to transport water over
enormous distances. Defendants presented evidence that
at some uncertain future date it may be economically
feasible to transport the Hueco and Mesilla Bolson water
elsewhere in New Mexico, but possible, or even probable,
future economic feasibility cannot satisfy the standard
set in Sporhase. So drastic and burdensome a measure as
a total ban on interstate commerce in ground water can
only be justified if it is narrowly tailored to times
and places of shortage.
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The purpose of the embargo is to promote New
Mexico's economic advantage. Even if the purpose were
conservation and preservation, as defendants maintain,
the embargo does not significantly advance the conservation
and preservation of water. It certainly is not narrowly
tailored to achieve that purpose and cannot survive
strict scrutiny.
The court recognizes that the conservation and
preservation of water is of the utmost importance to
the citizens of New Mexico. Defendants' and intervenors'
desire to retain the ground water in the Lower Rio
Grande and Hueco Basins for the use of New Mexicans,
therefore, is certainly understandable. Nevertheless,
the New Mexico ground water embargo violates the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution, and an Order
will be entered herein enjoining the defendants from
enforcing it.
-36-
